Ukraine is not lost to the EU
Despite concerns about the recent elections, there is still hope for a decent working relationship with Ukraine.
The elections held in Ukraine on Sunday (28 October) might easily be interpreted as cause for despair. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe says democracy is in reverse. Yulia Tymoshenko, the principal opposition leader, is in prison. The ruling party has extended its political control.
But it is also easy to lose perspective. Ukraine’s failings cannot be blamed wholly on the ruling party. The Orange revolutionaries of 2004, chief among them Tymoshenko, also bear responsibility. The new mixed electoral system – a key to the ruling party’s consolidation of power – returns Ukraine to the situation from 1998 to 2006, a time when its politics were not pretty, but were certainly pluralistic. Ukraine is not lost to the EU now, just as it was not lost then. In the medium and long run, the chances of developing a vibrant political system in Ukraine are far better than in Belarus or Russia.
However, there are two very important reasons for extra anxiety and new urgency. President Viktor Yanukovych is closer to consolidating his control over the political system than his predecessors and the presidential elections in 2015 could accelerate that process. Secondly, Ukraine’s regression shows that the European Union’s approach is not succeeding in leveraging the desired political change. The EU’s policy of ‘more for more’ – more support for more reform – is not exacting more effort from Ukraine.
If the current approach is not working and if Ukraine matters (it does, for innumerable reasons), then the EU needs to respond by doing more, the less ‘European’ Ukraine becomes.
It needs an approach based more on Ukraine’s characteristics and less on the template of previous enlargements or other states. Ukraine is not yet Russia: civil society is more active and allowed to breathe more freely. This is an area where more could be invested. Ukraine is not Belarus: Ukraine’s ruling elite is diverse, the regions more varied, the differences often substantial. There is potential to develop a richer set of relationships.
Despite appearances, winning legitimacy in European eyes does matter to many in Ukraine’s elite. That argues for more contact, not less, but the relationships must be challenging. European political groups should not trade political affiliation for a blind eye, soft words or blind support.
Nor should the EU shy away from using economic leverage. Ukraine’s 30 richest people reportedly now account for more than half the nation’s gross domestic product. These are men and women who need a bigger playing-field. Some of them have restructured the industries that they control enough for the EU to feel able to initial an association agreement with Ukraine. For them, the EU could be that playing-field, a bigger, richer and more predictable field than the customs union that Russia is offering. Economic self-interest could yet be a means to encourage the opening up of Ukraine’s political system.
Such investment, outreach and engagement would go beyond the current mandate of the European Commission. But problems like Ukraine are among the reasons why the Lisbon treaty created a diplomatic service, and why the idea of a European Endowment for Democracy was planted. The EU has tools available and it should use them in Ukraine, adopting a policy of ambition rather than despair.
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